

## From Inkomati to Maputo: Indicators for peace in Mozambique<sup>1</sup>

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The number of peace agreements signed in Mozambique also seems to clearly indicate how many times the government, RENAMO, international partners and the United Nations have not really bothered to create the conditions for a positive peace in the country, beyond media speeches and programs. Despite all these agreements, the concern of the national belligerents (FRELIMO and RENAMO), as well as the international partners, seems to be to do the bare minimum to end the war, and to avoid as much as possible any effort to introduce measures that would affect their modus operandi in the country. In the midst of these constant signatures of major national peacebuilding failures, it is important to reflect deeply on the apathy of international organizations, churches and civil society organizations that claim to participate in peacebuilding processes, and invest resources in projects whose design and implementation have little to do with positive peace indicators, apart from the names. What is rarely discussed is how donors, organizations linked to the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and non-governmental organizations (churches and NGOs) have never managed to create inclusive, open, transparent systems of governance internally and in their respective areas of action, and also in their relations with their beneficiaries, based on the rule of law.

### Introduction

The number of peace agreements signed in Mozambique also seems to clearly indicate the number of times the government, RENAMO, international partners and the United Nations have not really bothered to create the conditions for positive peace in the country, beyond

speeches and media programmes. The first attempt at conflict resolution through the signing of agreements between the Mozambican government and RENAMO was the Inkomati agreement with the South African government in 1984, which failed in its implementation process. The second was the General Peace Agreement, signed on 4 October 1992, which aimed to put an

<sup>1</sup> This Policy Brief is the result of an Occasional Paper written by Dilvan Chivangue on: *Indicadores da Paz em Moçambique: De Nkomati à Gorongosa*, <https://cepcb.org.mz/2023/11/29/indicadores-da-paz-em-mocambique-de-nkomati-a-gorongosa-op-5-cepcb-chivangue/>. The main document is in Portuguese

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end to the armed conflict that had lasted around 16 years. A while later, in 2014, the Gorongosa Agreement was signed, which aimed to guarantee stability for elections to be held. More recently, the 2019 Maputo Peace Agreement, known as the "Final Peace Agreement", was signed to complete the disarmament and demobilization of RENAMO guerrillas and their subsequent socio-economic reintegration, as well as the placement of some of these elements in the Mozambique Armed Defense Forces (FADM) and the Republic of Mozambique Police (PRM)<sup>4</sup>.

Despite all these agreements, the concern of the belligerents (FRELIMO and RENAMO), as well as the international partners, seems to be to do the bare minimum to end the war, and to avoid as much as possible any effort to introduce measures that would affect their modus operandi in the country. This Policy Brief offers basic information on how the different peace agreements in Mozambique take into account crucial indicators for peace, looking at the peace agreements signed in Mozambique from Inkomati (1984) to Maputo (2019), and points out three indicators that need to be considered in order to achieve positive results for peace in the country: (1) Openness of government, (2) Transparency and the rule of law, and (3) Exclusion by socio-economic group.<sup>5</sup>

In general, there is a great deal of political indifference in the country and a lack of social ownership of governance for peace. This Policy Brief suggests the approval of a peace and citizenship curriculum to be included as a

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<sup>4</sup> Kees Kingma (2009) "From Conversion to Peace-building; a reassessment of demobilization and reintegration in Africa.", por Michael Brzoska e Axel Krohn (eds.) *Overcoming Armed Violence in a Complex World*. (Budrich UniPress) pp. 65-78

compulsory subject in the first and second cycles of education in order to socialize and bring together perspectives on peace and its indicators throughout the country.

## ***Peace and its Indicators***

In Mozambique, the only aspect of peace that has been formally considered seems to be disarming RENAMO. The other aspects have been ignored by the government, and at most ONLY merit surgical intervention by donors in programs to empower ex-combatants or guerrillas. On the other hand, even though the peace processes in the country have always relied on the intervention of the United Nations (UN), it cannot be said that the experience of this international organization did prove to be useful in building lasting peace in the country.

This political negligence in implementing a peace-building agenda in Mozambique comes at a time when the international community has known for more than 50 years that peace is built with policies that go beyond disarming the former belligerents. The definition of peace, making a difference between negative peace (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and positive peace (inclusion and political and economic non-discrimination) had already been put forward by Johan Galtung in 1969. Galtung defines positive peace as not only the end of direct violence, but also the end of structural violence, or social injustice, insofar as this requires initiatives that allow for the equal distribution of power and resources, in the

<sup>5</sup> Ver o Occasional Paper do CEPCB "*Indicadores da Paz em Moçambique: De Nkomati à Gorongosa*", para uma discussão mais aturada dos indicadores. <https://cepcb.org.mz/2023/11/29/indicadores-da-paz-em-mocambique-de-nkomati-a-gorongosa-op-5-cepcb-chivangue/>

promotion of consensus values, development, justice and pluralism (Kemer, et al, 2016: 139) <sup>6</sup>. The idea of positive peace has led to the creation of different indicators to better assess progress in building peace, beyond the absence of war.

This approach by Johan Galtung is today the model when it comes to working with peacebuilding. Since 2005, the United Nations, through its Peacebuilding Commission, has had as one of its mandates "to bring together all relevant actors to mobilize resources and to advise and propose integrated strategies for peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery"<sup>7</sup>. This is achieved by the ambition:

*To serve as a platform to bring together all relevant actors, inside and outside the United Nations, including Member States, national authorities, United Nations missions and country teams, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society, women's groups, youth organization's and, where appropriate, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to provide recommendations and information to improve their coordination, develop and share good practices in peacebuilding, including institution building, and ensure predictable financing of peacebuilding<sup>8</sup>*

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<sup>6</sup> Kemer, T, et all (2016) A construção da paz em um mundo em transformação: o debate e a crítica sobre o conceito de peacebuilding. Revista Social e Política, Vol. 24, Nº 60, Pag 137- 150.

<sup>7</sup>Mandate: About the Commission, UN Peacebuilding Commission <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/about-the-commission>

In this context, war does not weigh so heavily in the peace-building process. For example, the Positive Peace Index (PPI) is an initiative that measures the level of peace in 163 countries, and is made up of indicators that capture different pillars of positive peace<sup>9</sup>, namely: (1) good governance, (2) a sound business environment, (3) equitable distribution of resources, (4) respect for human rights, (5) good relations with neighboring countries, (6) free flow of information, (7) a high level of human capital, (8) low levels of corruption (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022, p. 10). Once it is over, the relative weight of war in the indicators decreases dramatically and other factors must be considered

To illustrate this point, we have chosen three indicators and analyzed how they have been dealt with in the different peace agreements in the country, from Inkomati to Maputo. This analysis will therefore focus on the following indicators: (1) Openness of government and (2) Transparency; Rule of Law, linked to the pillar of good governance, and (3) Exclusion by socio-economic group, linked to the pillar of respect for human rights.

## **Indicators in the Peace Agreements in Mozambique**

The various agreements in Mozambique rarely contained elements linked to the promotion of

<sup>8</sup> Mandate: About the Commission, UN Peacebuilding Commission

<https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/about-the-commission>

<sup>9</sup> The Global Peace Index: Exploring the 23 Indicators of Peace, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/chart-of-the-week-indicators-of-peace/>, Vision of Humanity

peace. They were always end-of-war agreements, with little or no consideration of the causes of the wars or even the future after the war. Looking at the agreements, it is very easy to say or think that the common denominator of all of them, FRELIMO, is guilty of both the causes of the signature (the constant wars) and the failure (the lack of a lasting peace).

However, even if this is true of the Lusaka agreement, and partially true of the Inkomati agreement, from 1992 onwards, FRELIMO was no longer the sole implementer and guarantor of peace in the country. In addition to RENAMO, we have the United Nations, the self-proclaimed International Community, donors and civil society. Apart from RENAMO, these actors all claim success every year in implementing their programs linked to democracy, development and poverty reduction. As such, the failures of peacebuilding cannot be attributed entirely to FRELIMO, even though at many times beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that are totally destructive to peaceful coexistence in Mozambique are clearly visible within it.

The first peace agreement in Mozambique was signed on 7 September 1974 by the Portuguese colonial government and FRELIMO, which marked the end of a 10-year struggle to achieve independence for Mozambique. It is important to note that this first agreement contextualises the conflict in Mozambique, since the conditions dictated by FRELIMO in the agreement are today considered to be one of the indirect causes of the emergence of RENAMO.

*Inkomati: Agreement between discriminatory elites*

The second agreement, Inkomati in South Africa, was a non-aggression and good neighborliness agreement between the Government of the

People's Republic of Mozambique led by President Samora Moisés Machel and the Government of the Republic of South Africa under the leadership of Pieter Willem Botha, in 1984 with the aim of South Africa ceasing to support RENAMO and Mozambique also ceasing to support the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC).

With the signing of the Inkomati agreement, some aspects related to FRELIMO's approach to governance at that time became evident, such as the lack of inclusion of other nationalist projects, and the failure to recognize RENAMO and its actions. This aspect is related to the **government's openness** indicator, in that FRELIMO excludes RENAMO or other social forces from participating in the state-building process. It's important to emphasize that up until this point, due to the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship regime in force in the country, there has also logically been an absence of considerations linked to the **rule of law** indicator in the country.

This agreement was also unique because the governments of Mozambique and South Africa, governed by two different political systems (one of racial superiority and the other a dictatorship of Marxist Leninism), agreed that only the respective ruling elites and their followers had the right to participate in the political life of their respective countries.

*GPA: Agreement to maintain/access power*

The second agreement was the General Peace Agreement (GPA), signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 between the Mozambican government and RENAMO. And during this period the amnesty law (15/92 of 14 October 1992) was enacted. For

the GPA, the indicator relating to "**Exclusion by socio-economic group**" was not observed by the different actors, insofar as the amnesty law passed was not a mechanism for healing and including the community in the reconciliation process, but rather an instrument for absolving war criminals. With regard to "**open government and transparency**", it is possible to see that democratic institutions were set up that allowed citizens to participate by voting. And finally, the GPA marks a new phase for Mozambique, in which it migrates to a "**rule of law**".

From 1992 to the present day, the international community, academics and members of society have rightly pointed out the government's failings in implementing the GPA, and the anti-democratic measures taken by FRELIMO since then. This has happened, for example, in the partisanship of the state through the establishment and operation of FRELIMO party cells in state bodies (and even the compulsory collection of fees and other party management costs from civil servants).

What is rarely discussed is the way in which donors, organizations linked to the UN system, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and non-governmental organizations (churches and NGOs) have never managed to create inclusive, open, transparent systems of governance internally and in their respective areas of action, and also in their relations with their beneficiaries, based on the rules of a post-GPA rule of law. This happens even though the United Nations, for example, has resolutions and commissions mandated to coordinate these types of peace-building actions<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> UN Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/un->

### *Gorongozza: Agreement for bread and power*

In the 2014 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed between the government and RENAMO, one of the prevailing peace indicators that seems problematic for lasting peace is related to "**Exclusion by socio-economic group**", and "**Government openness and transparency**". In the 10 years prior to 2014, the government had in fact endeavored to exclude from the state apparatus and from socio-economic and cultural life any citizen who was not a member of FRELIMO, and absolutely excluded anyone who was part of another political party. This continuation of the same kind of problems decade after decade leaves us in doubt as to whether the problem of governance really lies solely with FRELIMO, or whether FRELIMO's political barbarities serve as a scapegoat for all the practices of misrule that may be being practiced by some agents of democracy and development in the country.

In the country, it is RENAMO that consistently refuses to integrate social groups into negotiations for peace or development in the country (and even allies itself with FRELIMO in this). The same RENAMO also refuses to take the initiative to design and discuss draft laws with the involvement of civil society and academia. To say that the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations and CSOs design and implement their projects in a more inclusive, transparent and open way than the government is also problematic in this respect.

The changes made in each agreement are always minimal, in order to ensure that whoever wins continues to hold absolute and despotic power.

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In this context, neither the government nor RENAMO show any openness to an exhaustive discussion of the electoral law, which means that it (and the irregularities committed around it) is continually a factor in conflicts in the country. This type of behavior means that the level of compliance with the "**Rule of Law**" indicator is very low. For example, in this agreement, the number of areas with municipalities was extended to provinces and districts, the amnesty law (17/2014) was enacted, but the discretionary powers of the executive were not changed, allowing it to unilaterally renege on some aspects of the peace process.

#### *Maputo: inclusion of weapons, not people*

It is in this context of disagreement and non-compliance that another peace agreement was signed on 6 August 2019 between the Mozambican government and RENAMO, the "Maputo Peace Agreement", better known as the "Definitive Peace Agreement". The "definitive" peace agreement focuses mainly on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of RENAMO's armed wing and defines the responsibilities of RENAMO and the government in this regard. Like the other agreements, this one was also accompanied by an amnesty law (Law 10/2019).

Despite the progress made in the peace-building process, it is clear that in the Maputo Peace Agreement (2019), no changes were observed in the indicator on "**Exclusion by socio-economic**

**group**", since both the government and RENAMO did not take the initiative to include other actors in the DDR process, clearly defining responsibilities for themselves. There was no discussion on issues of **open government and transparency**, and no independent verification mechanism was established regarding the state of implementation of the DDR. The weak involvement of citizens in the reconciliation process goes some way to demonstrating that DDR was a political mechanism for integrating armed men, rather than discussing other aspects of war and peace.

And finally, for the "**Rule of Law**" indicator, there was the introduction of the figure of the state representative at sub-national levels of government. This act usurped the powers of local governments, thus undermining the idea of local elections (governors and administrators) as a mechanism for the effective decentralization of executive power.

It is important to note that this agreement completely ignored all the people who provided logistical and social support to RENAMO at the grassroots level, focusing only on ex-combatants. Their wives and children, for example, became mere dependents, and not subjects entitled to full compensation for having been an active part of the war, as was legislated for the liberation war and its former combatants.

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## Reflection notes

The failures of the strategy of achieving peace by signing military agreements clearly show that consolidating peace in Mozambique is a challenge that is not limited to silencing the guns. It is clear that

each of the parties to the conflict (the government and RENAMO) signs these agreements ignoring the issues behind the constant wars in the country. This makes each political agreement a missed opportunity to decide on fundamental issues linked to the well-being of Mozambicans.

Between one part wanting to safeguard its right to absolute control of power and the other wanting to have absolute control, there was no room to promote the inclusion of other forces in the governing process, and even in the municipal areas where RENAMO had control, it did not promote the establishment of governing models based on positive peace indicators.

On these dates of the signing of major national peacebuilding failures, it is important to reflect deeply on the apathy of international organizations, churches and civil society organizations that claim to participate in peacebuilding processes, and invest resources in projects whose design and implementation have little to do with positive peace indicators, apart from their names.

We therefore make the following recommendations:

- Hold a national peacebuilding conference to create national peace indicators to guide the governance programs of political parties at various decision-making levels;
- Approval of a peace and citizenship curriculum to be included as a compulsory subject in the first and second cycles of the national education system;
- Creation of a national governance platform for peace overseen by the Assembly of the Republic with decisions approved by at least half of the deputies from each parliamentary group, to guarantee shared responsibility by the various actors (Government, Civil Society, Political Parties), with the advice of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.

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This series of Policy Briefs summarises the main conclusions, observations and reflections of the research, seminars, debates and round tables of the Centre for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Well-Being (CEPCB) in an accessible format.

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